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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This malpractice case arose because the defendant, Dr. 
Gerald Goodman of the Bryner Clinic, did not enter his controlled 
substance prescription refills into his patients' charts. This 
practice is admitted. (T. 70 L.2-21; T.75 L.16-21) 
Plaintiff saw Dr. Goodman three times, August, 1981, May and 
June, 1982. During the last two visits, the doctor prescribed 30 
and then 50 tablets of Fiorinal #3 for plaintiff's severe 
recurrent headaches. Dr. Goodman did not tell plaintiff what the 
Fiorinal #3 contained. (T.205 L.17 - T.206 L.6) 
Fiorinal #3 is a complex medicine. It contains caffeine to 
stimulate, aspirin to deaden pain, codeine to deaden pain, and a 
barbiturate, Butalbital, whose street name is Mspeed," which 
decreases tension and improves mood. It affects the mind like 
alcohol, but does not impair coordination. It produces euphoria, 
as alcohol does, and it destroys judgment and inhibitions. (T.98 
L.10; T.99 L.23; T.207 L.7-14; L.93 L.13-17; T.794 L.19; T.795 
L.8) Fiorinal #3 is such an addictive drug that there is a 
reported case, Whittle v. United States, 669 F.S. 501 (D.D.C. 
1987) where an attending physician was found liable for the death 
of a patient whose addiction was solely to Fiorinal #3. 
Dr. Goodman did not see nor speak to plaintiff again. 
Over the next 28 months, plaintiff obtained 26 refills, 
1,300 shots of speed, first a refill every two or three months, 
then a refill every month, and then two a month, during which 
latter period plaintiff was also obtaining many drugs from many 
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other doctors. (Appendix E and F) This was full scale 
addiction. 
When Dr. Goodman was served with plaintiff's Intent to Sue, 
annexed was a two page list of refills (Appendix E). Dr. Goodman 
looked at it and said, "I am amazed there are that many refills." 
(T.20 L.6-24) 
Despite that remark, Dr. Goodman, in his Answer, denied the 
pharmacist had called him for refill authorization. As a result, 
the plaintiff was forced to join the pharmacist, Gary Ransom. 
Both the doctor and the pharmacist had similar statutory 
duties intended to protect the patient from addiction due to 
unsupervised refills. A doctor's duty (58-37-8(2) Utah Code 
Annotated) is not to refill a controlled substance unless the 
doctor knew it was necessary for the patient's health at the time 
of the refill. The pharmacist's duty (58-17-14.8(11) Utah Code 
Annotated) is not to refill a controlled substance unless he has 
verbal authorization from a doctor. 
Either the pharmacist failed to call for authorization, in 
which event he would be negligent, or the doctor authorized 
refills without knowing the condition of his patient, which would 
make him negligent. 
The jury, having been instructed on both statutes, found the 
pharmacist not negligent and found the doctor negligent. 
Thus, on this appeal, we have the issue of fact of whether 
the doctor received the refill requests settled. The jury found 
the refills were communicated to the doctor. 
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The jury also found that the doctor's negligence was not a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's addiction. 
Points I and II of this Petition deal with the probable 
reason for the jury's allocation of cause. Plaintiff was not 
allowed at trial to ask the doctor as to each refill, if he knew 
the condition then of his patient, and what hazards were 
indicated in the patient's gradual increase in frequency of 
refills. 
Plaintiff submits that had he been allowed to ask these 
questions, the doctor's contribution to proximate cause would 
have been clearly established by the evidence. Dr. Goodman was 
the only doctor prescribing a highly addictive drug, the only 
doctor prescribing anything from April to September, 1983 (the 
period when plaintiff's use of the Fiorinal #3 escalated to 
monthly refills), and plaintiff had seen no doctor and had had no 
medications in the seven months before Dr. Goodman first 
prescribed the Fiorinal #3 (Appendix F) and plaintiff never used 
street drugs. The doctor is clearly linked to the addiction. 
The consequences to plaintiff were extreme. In May, 1982, 
he was 29 years of age, assistant branch manager for Walker Bank, 
married with five children, earning $30,000 a year, living within 
his income and didn't drink or smoke. (T.799 L.l; T.800 L.8) 
Plaintiff's experts at trial, a doctor, a pharmacist and a 
psychologist had testified that while most people recognize the 
danger when they use a substance, the addictive personality 
receives such rewards that they blind themselves to what is 
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happening, conduct termed "defensive denial." (T.205 L.10- T.204 
L.l; T.801 L.3-23) In 1984, plaintiff was fired because he 
would wander off from work and was approving loans for which 
people didn't qualify. (T.480 L.23-T.481 L.19) He totally broke 
loose from his budget, and spent over $100,000 on his home and 
family, using fradulently obtained loans from his bank to finance 
these. He was tried and convicted of bank fraud. In 1987 he 
served time in a federal psychiatric prison facility at Lompoc, 
California, where he finally conquered his addiction. He now 
works with retarded people at the Columbus Center at about a 
third the wage he received at the bank. Worse, just before his 
federal trial, addicted and destitute, he wrote $13,000 in checks 
to himself as Ward Clerk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IS IT ACCEPTABLE FOR AN ATTORNEY WHEN HIS 
CLIENT IS GIVING DAMAGING ANSWERS DURING A 
DEPOSITION, TO INTERRUPT THE DEPOSITION AND 
SECRETLY COACH THE CLIENT AS TO THE ANSWERS 
HE SHOULD GIVE, AND, AS A RESULT, THE 
DAMAGING CONCESSIONS ARE LOST TO THE 
DETRIMENT OF THE OPPOSING PARTY? IF THIS IS 
NOT ACCEPTABLE CONDUCT, WHAT SANCTIONS ARE 
APPROPRIATE? 
If the legal heart of the defense was breaking Dr. Goodman 
loose from the chain of proximate cause by denying he authorized 
refills, the job of the court hearing the matter on appeal is to 
recognize the trial dynamics. 
Plaintiff's complaint of the Court of Appeals' decision is 
that it totally misses the dynamics, and so comes to a wrong 
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decision. The right questions have to be asked to get the right 
answers. 
The vital question is why did Dr. Goodman's attorney take 
the doctor from his deposition. The Court of Appeals does not 
ask this question. It says, instead, that plaintiff shows no 
prejudice. It thereby put the burden on the wrong party. 
What are the dynamics? 
The record is clear. Appendix G, pages 4 to 6, is the vital 
part of the doctor's deposition. 
The doctor was asked if he would have authorized refills? 
He started to respond. Defendant's counsel jumped to his feet, 
told the doctor not to answer and headed him for the door. When 
plaintiff's attorney ran in front of the door saying, "I want 
this question answered before you leave the room or it will be 
your answer and not his." (Appendix G, P.5 L.4-5) Defendant's 
attorney actually said, "What are you going do, fist fight me 
Sam?" Mr. King replied: "If I have to ... He was starting to 
admit he is giving refills contrary to his previous testiomony, 
so you are taking him away." Defendant's counsel forced the 
doctor past plaintiff's counsel and out of the room, as Mr. King 
said, "You couldn't do it in court, Dave." (Appendix G, P.5 
L.19; P.5 L.21) 
In the staid world of law, these are indeed dynamics. 
Clearly both attorneys knew the case hung in the balance. 
Neither would have acted as he did for any other reason. The 
issue was precisely stated, the doctor was starting to admit the 
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truth so his attorney took him away. 
The Court of Appeals, when it says plaintiff wasn't harmed, 
fails to understand Dr. Goodman's attorney's purpose. He had to 
have a reason that was of screaming urgency to threaten opposing 
counsel with physical violence. 
Plaintiff's attorney was clearly in the right. 
If the doctor answered the pending question and its follow-
ups affirmatively, then he could have been examined at trial on 
every single refill he authorized. To do that would lock him 
into proximate cause. 
When the doctor returned to the room, his answers were 
innocuous. He admitted his attorney told him what to say in the 
hall. (Appendix G, P.37 L.2-12) The truth lost in that four 
minutes has never been retrieved. 
The United States Supreme Court recently considered this 
very question, Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594 (1989), when a 
defendant was not allowed to speak to his counsel during a break 
between direct and cross examination. On appeal the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that anything that allows 
the witness to recover his sense of composure and of tactics can 
interfere with the search for truth and so it was within the 
discretion of the trial judge to not allow that. The Supreme 
Court's point was absolutely on point for this case. It stated: 
Cross-examination often depends for its 
effectiveness on the ability of counsel to 
punch holes in a witness's testimony at just 
the right time and just the right way. 
When defendant's counsel told the doctor not to answer, 
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plaintiff's counsel stated, "No you can't interfere with my 
question to have a secret conference and tell him the answer." 
Defendant's counsel replied, "Show me the rules." 
(Appendix G, P.5, L.23-P.6, L.l) 
Utah needs the rules. It has no case law in point. 
Defendant's counsel makes no contention that this is the 
only time he has taken one of his clients from deposition. The 
speed and certainty with which he acted indicates long practice— 
if his client starts to hurt himself at deposition, counsel has 
his game plan worked out. Take the client out and talk to him. 
He acknowledged this stating, "I am going to talk to my witness. 
That is my job. I'm his counsel." (Appendix G, P.5, L.19-20). 
Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the logical 
corollary of Rule 1. In order to implement Rule 1's mandate that 
civil litigation be speedy, just and inexpensive, Rule 11 
requires attorneys to advance no cause in which they don't have a 
genuine objective belief. The attorney's conduct evidences 
disbelief. 
There have to be sanctions. 
This case is one of first impression in Utah. Our rules 
give some assistance. 
Rule 30. Depositions Upon Oral Examination, 
(c) Examination and cross-examination: oath; 
objections. 
Examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may proceed as permitted at trial 
under the provisions of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. (Addendum 1) 
As, at trial, a witness is not allowed to leave the stand to 
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be coached by his attorney when he commences making admissions 
damaging to his case, no greater latitude should be allowed 
during a sworn deposition. 
78-24-9 Utah Code Annotated. Witnesses. 
Duty to Answer Questions - Privilege. 
A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although 
his answer may establish a claim against 
himself; ... . (Appendix N) 
Plaintiff sought an answer. Pursuant to the statute, and 
Rule 30, defendant had a duty to give it. Interference by a 
third party, even counsel, between the right and duty should not 
be tolerated. Perry v. Leekef supra. 
Here is a scenario to conjecture on - the exact sequence of 
event occurs, but now it is at trial, and it is Judge Sawaya, not 
plaintiff's counsel, who as judge, insists the question be 
answered before the witness leaves the stand. Would defendant's 
counsel threaten to fistfight the judge? What would the judge do 
when defendant and his counsel return before the jury in four 
minutes? Would they last four minutes in the hall? Would Judge 
Sawaya require the doctor to tell the jury what his attorney just 
told him? Where would he send Mr. SlagleTf 
This conjecture does more than warm the heart of losing 
counsel. It makes a point. Defendant's counsel would have 
suffered the uncoached answer in court. He acted as he did at 
the deposition only because he thought he could get away with it. 
He was correct. During my 32 years of practice, I have not 
seen a single occasion in which a prominent attorney representing 
major corporate clients has ever received any sanction of the 
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slightest kind from the Utah State Bar Commission. While they 
are not invulnerable in theory, they are in fact. 
In so acting, Dr. Goodman's counsel violated 78-51-26, Utah 
Code Annotated. (Addendum 4) It reads: 
The Duties of Attorneys and Counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney or counselor: 
(4) to imply for the purposes of maintaining 
the causes confided to him such means only as 
are consistent with truth ... . 
[Emphas i s added] 
Defendant's counsel's violated this as his sole visible 
purpose was to keep the doctor from saying the truth. 
Counsel's conduct also violated the Code of Professional 
Conduct. DR7-102 provides that in the representation of his 
client a lawyer shall not assert a position when he knows it 
would serve to injure another, and that he shouldn't advance an 
"unwarranted defense." The defense that the pharmacist never 
called was "unwarranted," as the doctor was starting to 
acknowledge. It served to "injure" plaintiff. 
The offense has occurred. The harm has occurred. What 
should be done? Plaintiff suggests three sanctions: (1) find 
the issue adverse to the offending party; (2) compel the witness 
to testify as to the advice given (Argument Point II) and; (3) 
award fees and costs to the aggrieved party. 
Plaintiff submits that the rationale followed by the court 
in Gerrard v. Thomas, 20 U.2d 30, 432 P.2d 343 (1967), be 
followed. In Gerrard, when the defendant refused to answer a 
question in civil litigation because it might incriminate himr 
the court simply held that the fact in issue would be found 
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against him. The doctor's refusal to answer until coached was a 
refusal to answer. 
Because of the egregious character of the conduct, plaintiff 
also asks he be awarded fees and costs since the deposition, 
including those of the trial and this appeal, since the 
miscarriage of justice leads back directly to that incident. 
Haynie v. Ross Gear Div. of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237, 243 (6th 
Cir. 1986). Dreilinq v. Peuqot Motors of America, Inc., 768 F.2d 
1159 (10th Cir. 1985); Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 
F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1988); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc. 
827 F.2d 450, 454-58 (9th Cir. 1987); City of Yonkers v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988). 
Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988) 
(party estopped from claiming defenses known to be inadequate to 
sustain the party's in court position). 
Taylor v. Estate of Grant Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 1989) 
(party responsible for fees and costs after he should have known 
that his position was not supported by the facts). 
POINT II, 
SHOULD THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
PRIVILEGE COVERING ADVICE BY THE ATTORNEY TO 
THE CLIENT BAR THE CLIENT FROM TESTIFYING AS 
TO THAT ADVICE WHEN THE ATTORNEY HAS TAKEN 
THE CLIENT FROM HIS DEPOSITION WITH A 
QUESTION PENDING, AND TOLD THE CLIENT WHAT TO 
SAY? 
When the doctor returned to the deposition, he was asked: 
By Mr. King: Q. Dr. Goodman, have you just 
talked to your attorney? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And did he give you suggestions on how to 
answer the question that I had before you? 
A. He just gave me information on how I should 
respond, yes. 
Q. And what did he say? 
MR. SLAGLE: Don't answer that. That is privileged and 
confidential. (Appendix G, P.6 L.3-12) 
Bench conference on this matter is reported (T.550 L4-T.554 
L.12). Plaintiff's request to have the doctor testify as to what 
his attorney told him was denied. 
The attorney-client privilege, 78-24-8(2), Utah Code 
Annotated (Appendix N), is not absolute. 
In Hoffman v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1985), involving a 
nurse being present while counsel conferred with his client, the 
dissent pointed out two conditions precedent to the privilege 
being invoked. First, it is the client who must claim the 
privilege and, second, the content must be intended to be 
confidential. 
Here, the doctor never claimed the privilege. Plaintiff 
believes the attorney is estopped. Hardy v. Prudential, supra. 
Constructively, the conference was in plaintiff's presence. 
In defendant's trial brief in the Court of Appeals at page 
24, defendant's counsel states: 
To imply defense counsel convinced his client 
to perjure himself as was argued by 
plaintiff's counsel is offensive and 
inappropriate. The defense attorney 
considered it his obligation as an attorney 
to advise his client and he considered the 
conference justifiable. 
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How could the secret coaching be "justifiable?" 
The lawyer has two masters—the law and his client. He 
forgets the law is primary. He needs the aid of the courts to 
remind him. It is a strain on character to lose a point 
honestly. (Rules 1 and 11, U.R.C.P., Appendix J) 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) (when the 
attorney's statements are discoverable subject to the balancing 
of confidentiality on one side against th£ need for a fair trial 
to the other party). 
In Re: Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. 1982); (the privilege 
has to yield to the interest of justice). 
Saying the court must be "prepared ... to draw the line 
between creative lawyering and abuse of the legal process ...," 
sanctions were affirmed in Stewart v. International Oil & Gas, 
845 F.2d 196. 
The only possible way, other than denying the defense, to 
attempt to cure the harm done plaintiff is to allow plaintiff's 
counsel to ask Dr. Goodman at retrial, "Dr. Goodman, when your 
attorney took you out in the hall, he told you that if you 
conceded you didn't know how many times Mr. Ransom called you, it 
would destroy your defense, didn't he?" 
The question should be answered. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Corp. v. Underwriter's Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8 (111. 
1978) . 
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944), 
held "relevant evidence is freely admissible except as it is 
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privileged; and the privilege extends only so far as the policy 
behind it demands.M (United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 
401 P.S. 361 (Pa. 1975) . 
POINT III. 
A DOCTOR HAS A CONTINUING DUTY TO HIS PATIENT 
FOR WHOM HE PRESCRIBES AND REFILLS AN 
ADDICTIVE MEDICATION TO MAKE SURE THE PATIENT 
IS NOT HARMED. 
Utah case law is adequate in concept, but doesn't cover 
prescriptions. Due to the large number of prescription addicts, 
the specific issue should be addressed. 
58-37-8(2), Utah Code Annotated provides: 
58-37-8(2) , Utah Code Annotated, Controlled 
Substances. Prohibited Acts - Penalities -
(vi)For a practitioner licensed in 
accordance with this act knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer 
dosages of a controlled substance in excess 
of medically recognized quantities necessary 
to treat the ailment, malady or condition of 
the ultimate user. [Emphasis added] 
This statute is intended to protect the public. It puts the 
duty on the doctor. For each refill he has to know what quanity 
is necessary then for the benefit of his patient. 
This statute makes specific the general duties imposed by 
58-12-36(15), Utah Code Annotated. 
58-12-36, Utah Code Annotated. Medical 
Practice Act-"Unprofessional Conduct" 
defined-
The words, "unprofessional conduct" as 
relating to the practice of medicine are 
defined to include 
"(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to 
the recognized standards of ethics of the 
medical profession, or any conduct or 
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practice which does or might constitute a 
danger to the health, welfare or safety of 
the patient ... . [Emphasis added] 
Whittle v. United States, 669 F.S. 501 (D.D.C. 1987) 
involved a death due to the use, and then abuse, of Fiorinal #3. 
The attending physician, an army doctor, was held liable for 
failing to adequately monitor his patient while she was taking 
the Fiorinal pursuant to his prescription* 
Other cases affirming the doctor's duty to foresee 
medication harm are King v. Solomon, 81 NE2d 838 (Ma. 1948); Los 
Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 275 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1954); Ballenger 
v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 387 (N.C. 1978); Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 
Pa. D&C.2d 635 (Pa. 1959); Mueller v. Mueller, 221 NW.2d 39 (S.D. 
1974) (7-year course of treatment). 
Ballenger v. Crowell, supra, states that a doctor has to 
foresee that "an addict will act like an addict," and has a duty 
to protect the patient from himself. In terms of proximate 
cause, the actor has a duty to foresee consequences of his 
misconduct including possible negligence of the other actor, here 
the ultimate addiction of his patient, if that conduct can be 
anticipated. Jensen v. Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. et al, 611 
P.2d 363 (Utah, 1980), Hillvard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 U.2d 
143, 263 P.2d 287. 
* 
* 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED AS TO (A) PLAINTIFF'S 
THEORY OF DEFENDANT'S CONTINUING LIABILITY 
AND (B) THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IF HE REASONABLY 
RELIED ON HIS DOCTOR. 
The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion, the purpose of 
an exception to an instruction is: 
MTo give the trial court notice of the 
claimed error. This specificity requirement 
insures that the trial court will understand 
the basis of the objections and have a fair 
opportunity to correct any errors before the 
case goes to the jury." 
It faulted plaintiff's counsel for not taking detailed 
exceptions, and so refused to consider the instructions. 
Plaintiff agrees with the Court of Appeals that the purpose 
of exceptions is to give the judge notice. 
What the Court of Appeals missed, the point made by 
plaintiff in his brief to that Court, is that the purpose is 
totally frustrated when the judge doesn't learn from the 
exceptions because he isn't in the room. Appendix I is the 
transcript of proceedings after the jury went out and of 
plaintiff's exceptions. It shows they were taken in an empty 
courtroom, the jury already deliberating and Judge Sawaya in his 
chambers. 
Counsel is virtually forced to agree that the court won't 
listen to the exceptions when the court makes it clear that it 
doesn't want to. Counsel should not be in that position. It 
was a long trial. During it, Judge Sawaya did allow counsel time 
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to argue for their proposed instructions. Plaintiff won some of 
those debates, lost most. Those were his actual exceptions. 
As no "notice" could be given, plaintiff's counsel made very 
abbreviated exceptions. Essentially, he simply listed his 
requests not given whose omission he felt was important. These 
included plaintiff's proposed instructions 5, and 7a. 
Plaintiff's request #5 (Appendix Q) listed the multiple 
ways, based on the evidence, in which plaintiff claimed Dr. 
Goodman had been negligent. It concentrated on his breach of his 
continuing duties. 
Rather than giving plaintiff's request #5, the court gave 
its instruction 14 (Appendix T), a general statement that a 
doctor is liable if he fails to meet the acceptable levels of 
standards of practice of his profession, and instruction 15 
(Appendix U) that the jury could find the doctor negligent if he 
violated 58-37-8(2). 
Plaintiff's requested instruction 7a (Appendix 0) stated 
that if plaintiff became drug dependent or addicted before he had 
reason to stop relying on Dr. Goodman, the jury was not to find 
the plaintiff contributorily negligent. This was based on the 
testimony of plaintiff and Mr. Ransom that every time plaintiff 
came into his store, Mr. Ransom would call the Bryner Clinic, 
explain the refill request and, after receiving authorization, he 
would refill the prescription. (T.205 L.17; T.206 L.6; T.108 L.7; 
T.112 L.9) This led plaintiff to believe the doctor approved of 
the refills. 
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The court gave no instruction on this point. 
In Utah law, Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 746 P.2d 384 (Utah 1988) 
is virtually dispositive. In Mikkelsen, plaintiff received a hip 
replacement from the defendant doctor. While skiing, the 
replacement gave way leaving plaintiff crippled. The doctor 
denied he ever said she could ski. Plaintiff produced evidence 
that the doctor had authorized it. In Mikkelsen, each of the 
points above are present. 
The trial court refused plaintiff's requested instruction 
setting out the various individual forms of negligence of the 
doctor. The trial court also refused to give plaintiff's request 
that she was not guilty of any degree of comparative negligence 
until the doctor carried the burden of proof of showing that she 
was not acting within his instructions. 
The Court of Appeals reversed on both points, finding both 
vital flaws which might have led to the jury's verdict. 
POINT V. 
DUE TO IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT IN THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR NEW 
TRIAL. 
The jury didn't reconcile the conflict inherent in its 
verdict. It found the pharmacist not negligent. That means it 
found he complied with his statutory duty to call for refill 
authorization for each refill. If he hadn't done that, he would 
have been negligent. The jury thus disbelieved Dr. Goodman's 
defense that he was never called for the refills. 
What the jury didn't think through was that if the 
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pharmacist did call, the doctor then had genuine, actual notice 
of each refill. It is the doctor's fault, not plaintiff's, that 
he could not be bothered to record or consider the refills. It 
is submitted that the jury's appreciation of that would have led 
inevitably to a finding of some decree of proximate cause on the 
part of the doctor. The finding of "zero" proximate cause by the 
doctor is irreconcilable with the rest of the verdict. 
The case is cumulative. If plaintiff had been able to 
examine the doctor as to each refill, the doctor would have been 
factually tied to cause. If the plaintiff's requested 
instructions had been given, the dcotor would have been legally 
tied to cause. Lacking these, the jury's verdict is more 
understandable, but still patently wrong. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-petitioner prays the court grant his Writ of 
Certiorari, that plaintiff be given the relief sought above, 
together with all fees and costs from the date of Dr. Goodman's 
deposition and such other relief as the court deems proper. 
DATED July 20, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING £/ 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of appellees, 
Dr. Gerald Goodman and Bryner Clinic, based on a jury's 
determination in a special verdict that their negligence was 
not a proximate cause of injuries to Duane Quistberg. He 
appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial. We affirm 
and award double costs to appellees. 
Appellant first contends that the trial court should have 
granted him a new trial because the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's finding of no proximate cause, which is 
an essential element of a negligence action that is generally a 
question of fact for the jury. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer 
Co., Inc.. 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, 
denied. 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (1990). When a trial court 
denies a motion for new trial brought on the basis of 
insufficient evidence/ we reverse the trial court Honly if/ 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
who prevailed/ we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict.- Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 
1988) (citing King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d 618/ 620-21 (Utah 
1987)). An appellant making such a claim must first marshal 
all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then show 
that the evidence cannot support the verdict. Hansen, 761 P.2d 
at 17-18. 
Appellant has neglected to fulfill either aspect of his 
burden on appeal. He merely refers us to evidence in the 
twenty-five volume record that would support a finding contrary 
to the one actually made by the jury. In light of appellant's 
failure to marshal the supporting evidence and to demonstrate 
its insufficiency/ we decline to consider further appellant's 
challenge to the jury's finding in its special verdict. 
Appellant next claims he is entitled to a new trial 
because of opposing counsel's misconduct during a pretrial 
deposition of appellee Goodman. At the deposition/ appellant's 
counsel was posing a hypothetical to the doctor/ asking him 
whether he would have authorized Fiorinal refills for Quistberg 
if the pharmacist had actually contacted him# which Goodman had 
repeatedly denied. Goodman's attorney/ David Slagle/ stopped 
his client from answering and took Goodman into the next room 
for "consultation- for four minutes/ all over the vociferous 
objections of appellant's counsel. When Goodman returned/ he 
answered the hypothetical in the affirmative/ but refused to 
say what his attorney had told him during the break in the 
deposition/ claiming the attorney-client privilege. The 
applicable statute provides/ in relevant part/ that H[a]n 
attorney cannot/ without the consent of his client/ be examined 
as to any communication made by the client to him/ or his 
advice given therein/ in the course of professional 
employment. . . .- Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) (1987). 
Appellant's counsel did not immediately act on his 
objections to what had transpired at the deposition. At trial 
two years later, he was permitted to read the relevant portion 
of the Goodman deposition transcript into the record/ allowing 
the jury to draw its own conclusions about Goodman's testimony 
after the mid-question consultation with Slagle. But the trial 
court refused to compel Goodman to disclose the content of his 
attorney's advice to him during the deposition break. 
In his motion for new trial and before this court/ 
appellant claims that this exclusion of the content of Slagle's 
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advice to Goodman constituted prejudicial error, even though 
appellant concedes that there was no fraud committed here. 
Appellant has not demonstrated any reason why the privilege 
should not have been applicable to the confidential 
attorney-client communication in this case, which was clearly 
made in the course of Slagle's professional employment. 
Although appellant asserts that the exclusion denied him a fair 
trial, he tries to demonstrate prejudice by distorting the 
substance of the interrupted deposition testimony as well as 
the importance of the pending question. From our complete 
review of the deposition transcript, it is apparent that, 
contrary to appellantfs repeated mischaracterizations, Goodman 
was not on the verge of admitting that he had authorized 
refills for Quistberg when Slagle took him out for 
consultation. He was being asked a hypothetical question about 
whether he would have authorized refills if he had been 
contacted by the pharmacist, which called for a simple yes or 
no response. After the interruption by Slagle, appellant*s 
counsel repeated the question and Goodman answered "yes," the 
response appellant had presumably wanted. 
For these reasons, it is beyond dispute that the 
attorney-client communication here was privileged, and Goodman 
could not be compelled to reveal it. Thus, the trial court 
committed no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new 
trial insofar as it was based on the exclusion of the 
privileged communication. 
Finally, appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial 
because of prejudicial error resulting from the trial court's 
failure to give three of his requested instructions. Appellant 
contends on appeal that instructions 5 and 6 were essential to 
inform the jury of the doctor's continuing duty to monitor a 
patient's condition when prescription refills for potentially 
addictive drugs are authorized. Number 7 should have been 
given, appellant claims, because only it explained his theory 
of the case insofar as it stated that he could not be 
contributorily negligent if his drug addiction occurred while 
he was reasonably relying on the advice of his physician. 
Appellant voiced no objections in the trial court to the 
correctness or completeness of the instructions that were 
actually given to the jury. And, as appellees point out, the 
issues raised on appeal were not adequately raised in 
appellant's general exceptions on the record to the trial 
court's refusal to give his proposed instructions 5, 6, and 7. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 51, a party may not assign as error the 
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giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto, and the objection must be sufficiently specific to 
give the trial court notice of the claimed error. E.A. Strout 
W. Realty v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). 
The specificity requirement ensures that the trial court will 
understand the basis of the objections and have a fair 
opportunity to correct any errors before the case goes to the 
jury. Hansen, 761 P.2d at 16. A party who fails to comply 
with this requirement is generally precluded from raising on 
appeal an issue based on a specific objection to jury 
instructions that was not presented first to the trial court. 
See id. Although Rule 51 does permit us to address such issues 
even though they were not properly preserved below, appellant 
has presented no persuasive reason why we should exercise that 
discretion, E.A. Strout W. Realty, 665 P.2d at 1322, which 
requires "showing special circumstances warranting such a 
review.- Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 
(Utah 1987). We will therefore not consider appellant's 
challenge to the trial courtfs refusal of his proposed 
instructions. 
The judgment is affirmed. Because we conclude that this 
appeal is frivolous, appellees' request for sanctions pursuant 
to Utah R. App. P. 33 is granted. Appellees Goodman and Bryner 
Clinic are awarded double costs on appeal. 
Norman H. Jackson^Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
ante la T. Greenwood, Judge P m l 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUN¥?JTY CL,^K 
STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE QUISTBERG, 
Plaintiff, SPECIAL VERDICT 
vs. 
Civil No. 85-6037 
GERALD N. GOODMAN, BRYNER 
CLINIC, a Utah corporation, and Judge James Sawaya 
GARY RANSOM, 
Defendants. 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance 
of the evidence. If you find that the evidence preponderates 
in favor of the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find 
that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, 
answer "no." 
1. Was the defendant Dr. Goodman negligent as alleged by 
the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: UuJlft 
2. Was such negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the 
damages of which plaintiff complains? 
ANSWER: n p 
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3. Was the defendant Bryner Clinic negligent as alleged 
by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: IA^J> 
4. Was such negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the 
damages of which plaintiff complains? 
ANSWER: ftp 
5. Was the defendant Gary Ransom negligent as alleged by 
the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: £)£ 
6. Was such negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the 
damages of which plaintiff complains? 
ANSWER: hp 
If you have determined that none of the defendants' conduct 
caused the plaintiff's damages, then do not proceed with the 
following questions. Sign and return the verdict form. 
Otherwise proceed. 
7. Was the plaintiff negligent as alleged by the 
defendants? 
ANSWER: i^jy 
8. Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of 
the damages complained of by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: uiP 
9. Do you consider plaintiff to have been 50% or more 
negligent? 
ANSWER: Uijfr 
If you answered question 9 above "yes," do not proceed with 
the following questions; sign the verdict and return it. 
Otherwise, proceed. 
10. Considering all the fault of the defendants, if any, 
that you have found to be a cause of plaintiff's damages and 
all the fault of the plaintiff, if any, that you have found to 
be a cause of plaintiff's damages to total 100%, what part of 
the fault do you find attributable to: 
A. Plaintiff % 
B. Defendant Dr. Goodman % 
C. Defendant Mr. Ransom % 
D. Defendant Bryner Clinic % 
11. Considering only the instructions and evidence 
concerning damages, and without being concerned with the effect 
or fault of either party on damages in answering this question, 
state what amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for any and all damages, if any, he 
has sustained as a result of the accident in question. 
A: General Damages $ 
B: Special Damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED this 1*5 day of October, 1988^ i 
ikk^ ™^ - — 
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o * . : •; wi COUNT!. UT, \* 
OCT ?5 3uuPH'BB 
DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975) ^ W r ~ 
ELIZABETH KING (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Gerald N, Goodman and Bryner 
Clinic, a Utah corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE QUISTBERG, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
v. 
GERALD N. GOODMAN, BRYNER ?,^^"?flf23e ca,«, a 
„ „,-_ ... . . . Judge James S. Sawaya 
CLINIC, a Utah corporation, * 2 
and GARY RANSOM, 
Defendants. 
• 
The above-captioned case came on regularly for jury 
trial beginning on October 4, 1988, with the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya presiding. The case was submitted to the jury to 
return a Special Verdict pursuant to Rule 49(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, on October 13, 1988. The jury returned 
the Special Verdict finding that defendants Goodman and Bryner 
Clinic were negligent, but their negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's claimed damages; that defendant Ransom 
was not negligent; and that plaintiff Quistberg was negli^^,N 
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of his own injuries 
and damage and that he was more than 50 percent at fault in 
causing his own damage. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the Special Verdict, Judgment 
is hereby entered for and on behalf of each of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff, no cause for action, with costs 
awarded to the defendants. 
DATED this j ^ ^ d a y of October, 1988. 
JAMES- S. SAWAYA X A T T F Q T 
DISTRICT JUDGED „ " ^ ^ ^ 
ftv.^ Xv s^fi^) .. / 
^rwAr^y , . ^ v / 
•2-
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hUn n- Q A ue PI! f h 
DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Gerald N. Goodman and 
Bryner Clinic, a Utah corp. 
Eleventh Floor, 
10 Exchange Place 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE QUISTBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD N. GOODMAN, BRYNER 
CLINIC, a Utah corporation, 
and GARY RANSOM, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
No. C-85-6037 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Motion of plaintiff for a Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial, came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
on Monday, October 31, 1988. The plaintiff was represented 
by Samuel King and the defendants Gerald N. Goodman and 
Bryner Clinic were represented by David W. Slagle. The 
Court, having reviewed the Motion and Memorandum of the 
plaintiff, and having heard oral argument of the parties, 
APPENDIX D> Pa9e 1 
and being fully advised, denied plaintiff's Motions. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions 
of plaintiff for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
and for a New Trial be and the same hereby are denied. 
DATED this 7 day of November, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
fc-*^?* 
!ES s. SAWAY; 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Date Drug 
QUISTBERG PRESCRIPTIONS 
Physician Pharmacy 
4/4/81 
6/26/81 
11/30/81 
None 
Didrex 50 mg- #75 
Tylenol w/codeine 
Empirin w/codeine 
1981 
Brown 
Haight 
Haight 
January, 1982 
Medicine Shoppe 
Medicine Shoppe 
Medicine Shoppe 
February, 1982 
None 
tfone 
tfone 
10 
22 
22 
2 
Fiornal #3 #30 
Penicillin 
Fiornal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
March, 1982 
April, 1982 
May, 1982 
Goodman 
June, 1982 
Goodman 
Goodman 
July, 1982 
Goodman 
August, 19J2 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
L6 
L6 
L6 
APC & Codeine #3 #24 Haight 
Co-pyronil #50 Haight 
Tetracycline 250 mg. #36 Haight 
September, 1982 
Paregoric 120 cc Goodman 
Vibramyacin 100 mg. #10 VanOrden 
Entex LA #40 VanOrden 
Organidin VanOrden 
Percocet #20 VanOrden 
Medicine Shoppe 
Medicine Shoppe 
Medicine Shoppe 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
-1-
Fiorinal #3 #50 
October, 1982 
Goodman 
November, 1982 
Medicine Shoppe 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
December, 1982 
Goodman 
January, 1983 
Medicine Shoppe 
February, 1983 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Didrex 50 mg. #28 
Didrex 50 mg. #28 
Emprin w/Codeine 1/2 
Didrex 50 mg. #28 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Didrex 50 mg. #28 
Lovothroid 
Didrex 50 Mg. #28 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Empirin w/Codeine 1/2 
Goodman 
Barton 
March, 1983 
Barton 
g. Haight 
Barton 
April, 1983 
Goodman 
Barton 
Barton 
Barton 
May, 1983 
Goodman 
June, 1983 
Goodman 
July, 1983 
Goodman 
August, 1983 
Goodman 
September, 1983 
Goodman 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Haight 
October, 1983 
r 
r 
r 
.2 
.7 
!7 
Amoxicillin 600 mg 
Naldecan #30 
Percocet #20 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Percocet 
Fiorinal #30 
#30 Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Goodman 
Nielsen 
Jones 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine Shoppe 
ZCMI 
November, 1983 
2 
4 
4 
4 
2 
8 
3 
2 
2 
) 
) 
i 
L 
L 
Amoxillin #30 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Amoxicillin 500 mg 
Naldecon #30 
Naldecon #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3. #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Cafergot #12 
Cafergot 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Cafergot 
Elavil 25 mg. #30 
Amitriptylene 
Fiorinal #30 
Cafergot 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Tylenol #3 
Ornade #10 
Elavil 25 mg. #100 
Ampicillin 500 mg. 
Amitriptylene 
Didrex #14 
Fiorinal #30 
Nielsen 
Jones 
Goodman 
. #30 Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Jones 
December, 1983 
Goodman 
Jones 
Jones 
Jones 
January, 1984 
Goodma.n 
Jone$* 
Jon6s 
Jones 
Jones 
Jones 
Jones 
February, 1984 
Goodman 
Jones 
Jones 
Jones 
#30 Jones 
Jones 
Barton 
Jones 
March,1984 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Medicine 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
Lowe•s 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
Lowe•s 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Lowe•s 
Lowe•s 
Lowe's 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Goodman 
Jones 
Goodman 
Medicine Shoppe 
ZCMI 
Medicine Shoppe 
--*-
April, 1984 
Fiorinal #30 
Cafergot 
Elavil 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Jones 
Jones 
Jones 
Goodman 
May, 1984 
Cafergot #30 
Fiorinal #30 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Adipost #14 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
#100 
Jones 
Jones 
Barton 
Barton 
Jones 
Goodman 
ZCMI 
Medicine Shoppe 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #30 
Adipost #14 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Adipost #14.' 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Adipost #14 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Adipost #14 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Fiorinal #30 #50 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Adipost #14 
#100 
#100 
#100 
#100 
1 
Jones 
Jones 
Barton 
Barton 
Goodman 
June, 1984 
Jones 
Barton 
Jones 
Goodman 
Barton 
July, 1984 
Barton 
Barton 
Jones 
Goodman 
Jones/ 
Barton 
Barton 
August, 1984 
Goodman 
Jones 
Jones 
Goodman 
Barton 
September, 1984 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
Smith's 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Lowe's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Medicine 
ZCMI 
ZCMI 
Medicine 
Smith's 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Shoppe 
Smith's 
Smith's 
ZCMI 
Medicine Shoppe 
-4-
October, 1984 
Tenormin 
Fiorinal #30 
Tylenol #3 
Darvon #12 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Fiorinal #30 
Elavil #100 
Amoxicillin 500 
Naldecan #30 
Vancenase Inh 
Fiorinal #3 #20 
Thyroxin .1 mg. 
Adipost #14 
Fiorinal #30 
Darvon 65 #12 
Fiorinal #3 #50 
Imipramine 
Davon 65 #12 
Elavil #100 
Fiorinal #30 
Darvan 65 #12 
Amoxicillin 500 
Naldecan #30 
mg. 
#100 
Hawkins 
Jones 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Goodman 
Jones 
Jones 
#30 Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Barton 
Barton 
Jones 
Hawkins 
Goodman 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Jones 
Jones 
November, 1984 
Barton 
mg. #30 Nielsen 
Vanceril Aer Inhaler 
Adipost #14 
Thyroxin 1/mg. #100 
Adipost #14 
Adipost #14 
Valium 
Percocet 
Fagament 300 mg. 
Flexeril 
Flexeril #20 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Flexeril 10 mg* 
Imipramine 50 mg 
#60 
#21 
. #15 
Nielsen 
#17 Nielsen 
Barton 
Barton 
December, 1984 
Barton 
Barton 
Holy Cross, 
Holy Cross, 
January, 1985 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
ZCMI 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Medicine 
Jo1ley's 
Jo1ley's 
Jo1ley's 
Jolley's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
ZCMI 
Smith's 
Medicine 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Smith's 
Shoppe 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Shoppe 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Nielsen, Surgery 
Nielsen, Surgery 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
- 5 -
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February, 1985 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Imipramine 50 mg. #14 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Tagamet 300 mg. #60 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
March, 1985 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Darvon #12 
Ativen 2 mg. #20 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Tagamet 300 mg. #60 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
Ativan 2 mg. #20 
Ledercillin 250 mg. #40 
RN-TUSS GREEN IQ #120 
ERYC 250 mg. #40 
Ativan #20 
RN-TUSS x HYDROCODONE #180 
ERYC 250 mg. #40 
Flexeril 10 mg. #10 
Ativen 2 mg. #10 
Flexeril 10 mg. #21 
RU-TUSS GREEN l.IQ 3120 
Vancenase Inhaler #17 
Nasalcrom spr. 40 mg/ML #13 
ASA-Codeine #20 
Amoxicillin 500 mg. #45 
RU-TUSS GREEN l.IQ #120 
Fiorinal #3 #15 
Ergostat 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
April, 1985 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Vogler 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Hawkins 
10 Nielsen 
Nielsen 
May, 1985 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
Hawkins 
June, 1985 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Nielsen 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Jolley's 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
Corner 
-6-
Tagamet 300 mg. 
Tenormin #50 
Fiorinal #3 #12 
Ergostat 
Fiorinal #3 #12 
Ergostat 
Fiorinal 
Ergostat 
#60 
July, 1985 
Hawkings 
Barlow 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Vogler 
Skaggs 
August, 1985 
Amoxicillin 500 mg, 
Amoxicillin 500 mg. 
Naldecon #30 
Illegible Rx 
Amoxicillin 500 mg. 
Percocet #15 
Fiorinal #3 #30 
Tusstovex #20 
Valium #30 
Tylenal #3 w/Codeine 
September, 1985 
#30 Nelson 
#30 Nelson 
Nelson 
October, 1985 
Richards 
November, 1985 
#30 Gray 
Gray 
Gray 
Gray 
Barlow 
#30 Barlow 
December, 1985 
Jolleyfs Corner 
Jolley's Corner 
Jolleyfs Corner 
Jolley's Corner 
Jolleyfs Corner 
Jolleyfs Corner 
Jolley's Corner 
1986 
Advil 400 
Tuinal 
Tuinal, refill denied 
Valium #30 
Dalmane #30 
Tylenol #3 
Dalmane #30 
Tylenol #3 #30 
Lortab «20 
Amoxil 500 mg. #30 
Richards 
Richards 
Richards 
Barlow 
Barlow 
Barlow 
Barlow 
Barlow 
Gray 
Gray 
Skaggs 
Skaggs 
-7- Aw'b/i 
he did contact the Bryner Clinic each time, the only thing 
you can say is that his contacts were not relayed to you 
by your staff; is that right? 
MR, SLAGLE: If you assume that he called. 
Q (BY MR. KING) If you assume that he called. 
MR. SLAGLE: Make that assumption. 
MR. KING: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: The calls would have been referred 
from the nurses to me. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Well, on the one hand we have 
Mr. Ransom saying he did contact the Bryner Clinic each 
time and on your part you say you donft think you authorized 
that many refills, so I am trying to find where the reguests 
for refill authorizations went. Please help me. 
A There weren't any refills authorized. 
Q By you? 
A That's right, and by the nurses, 
Q How do you know they weren*t authorized by the 
nurses? 
A I have talked with the nurses. 
Q Which ones? 
A I have talked with Cheryl McKenna and Debbie 
Wegcamps, and Kathy Lamp, and Gaylene Schmardebeck. 
Q And they all say that Mr* Ransom did not call 
with these refill requests? 
32 
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A They said that they have no recollections, or 
recall, or record of calls from The Medicine Shop regarding 
Mr. Quistberg. 
Q Did they say they didn't have any recall of 
any that they had not referred to you? 
A They did not recall any calls by Mr. Quistberg. 
Q Which one of these worked with you for the longest 
period of time during 1982 and 1984? 
A Cheryl McKenna, Debbie Wegcamps# and Gaylene 
Schmardebeck. 
Q Why did each of these ladies leave the employ 
of Bryner Clinic? 
A Wellf one got a family, the other moved to Logan, 
because her husband got a job there, and Gaylene Schmardebeck 
still works for us. 
Q Speaking generally, Doctor# it is the responsibility 
of the doctor to monitor the controlled substances that 
he prescribes for a patient. You know that, don't you? 
A Right. 
Q You know that sometimes you have seen occasions 
where the doctor realized that the patient became addicted 
before the patient realized it, haven't you? 
A Yes, that is possible. 
Q It is somewhat analogous to a drunk might be 
the last person to know that he is a drunk, everybody 
33 
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else who knows him knows it first? Right? 
A Yes. 
Q And it is the same kind of thing with addiction 
to a controlled substance, isn't it? 
A Yes, 
Q And you are aware of the statutes in the Controlled 
Substance Act that no controlled substance can be refilled 
unless it is for the treatment of a known condition? Right? 
Are you familiar with that law? 
A I don't recall it worded specifically as to 
that. 
Q But you know the concept? 
A Yes. 
Q And you cannot refill a controlled substance 
unless it is to treat a known condition of your patient? 
A A condition that would be indicated for treatment. 
Q Right. And you knew of no condition indicating 
Fiorinal 3 for Mr/ Quistberg after you last saw him? 
A At the time I saw him he complained of headaches, 
yes. 
Q And how long would you refill the prescription 
for those headaches; as long as he needed it? 
A If a person needed it, yes. 
Q And he had described to you, from what you remembeij, 
quite a long history of intense headaches, hadnft he? 
34 
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A He described to me headaches, yes. 
Q I thihk you used the word intense. 
A Okay. 
Q If I am misquoting you, I think it was some 
adjective indicating they were strong headaches. 
A Yes. 
Q And for that you would refill the Fiorinal on 
occasions as the headaches continued to trouble him, wouldn't} 
you? 
A Yes. 
Q So if he would call back or contact the druggist, 
and a call would come in six weeks or something later 
zor a refill, and you knew the condition, you would refill 
the prescription, wouldn't you? 
MR. SLAGLE: Are you putting it in the hypothetical 
or are you asking actual facts? 
MR. KING: I am putting this hypothetically. 
MR. SLAGLE: If this in fact happened. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Yes* Based on the history you 
had of Duane#if he had contacted the druggist, and the 
druggist contacted you, you would have refilled the 
Fiorinal, wouldn't you? 
MR* SLAGLE: Just a minute before you answer. 
MR. KING: No, you canft interfere with my questiorj 
to have a secret conference and tell him the answer. 
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1 MR. SLAGLE: Show me the rules. 
2 MR. KING: Keep this on the record. 
3 MR. SLAGLE: Please do. 
4 MR. KING: I want this question answered before 
5 you leave the room or else it will be your answer and 
6 not his. 
7 MR. SLAGLE#: You don't instruct my client. 
8 MR. KING: No, I want the question answered. 
9 MR. SLAGLE: What are you going to do; fist 
10 fight me? 
11 MR. KING: If I have to. You can't take him 
12 out unless he answers the question. You are going to 
13 tell him not to answer that. He started to admit— 
14 Are you getting this down? 
15 THE REPORTER: Yes. 
16 MR.KING: He was starting to admit he is giving 
17 refills contrary to his previous testimony so you are 
18 taking him away. 
*
9
 MR. SLAGLE: I am going to talk to my witness. 
20 That is my job. I am his counsel. 
21 MR. KING: You couldn't do it in Court, Dave. 
22 (Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m. November 7, 1985, 
23 a recess was taken until 11:04 a.m. on the same day, at 
24 which time the following proceedings were had.) 
25
 MR. KING: I want ever word of that colloquy 
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1 included in the transcript. 
2 EXAMINATION, Continued: 
3 BY MR. KING: Q. * Dr. Goodman, have you just • 
4 talked to your attorney? 
5 k Yes. 
6 Qi And did he give you suggestions on how to answer 
7 the question that I had before you? 
8 I A He just gave me information on how I should 
9 respond,..yes* 
10 Qt And what did he say? 
11 MR. SLAGLE: Don't answer'that. That is privilege^ 
12 and confidential. 
13 a (BY MR. KING) He did tell you how to respond? 
14 \J I will restate the question. ^ The question was: With 
15 J the condition of severe headaches that Duane had described 
16 to you, if in six weeks or so he got in touch with the 
17 pharmacy, and the pharmacist contacted you, you would 
18 have authorized a refill of Fiorinal No. 3; isn't that 
19 true? 
20 A Yes, that is possible, 
21 Qt Aid as these continued, until it came to your 
22 attention that there was an abuse of his refills, you 
23 would have continued to refill it, wouldn't you? 
24 A No. 
25 Q, At what point would you have cut it off? 
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Mari ta l History ?7P-qfiQ3 
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Pain 2" Leutiprrhca 0 1 J±l Date of Last Period 
T~ 
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_ Epigastric burning. 
"~^ For the past two years, the patient has had epigastric burning and retrosternal burning 
—and reflux of gastric contents into the mouth.—This occurs after large meals, after 
spicey foods and at night. 
General appearance - a 234 pound white male in no acute distress. Chest - clear to AP; 
—Kear4 regular rhythm without murmurs, rubs, or gallops.—Bft—normal.—epigastrium 
is negative. 
Reflux esophagitis. 
—Tagamet, weight reducing diet» no meals after 7:00 p.m., recheck in two or three weeks. 
- , , 5BJ/dh 
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_S£____m Miqrarine headaches. 
Symptoms include headaches, frontal area, usually brought on with stress, lasting four 
hours and associated with nausea. His diet is somewhat irregular eating a 16C0T juhlT 
food, also puur exercise habits and just sliyhlly uverweiyht: 
-& General appearance Healthy. 
RP- Normal 
HEENT - Unremarkable. 
A: Tension headaches. 
TT normal plain I taolei q <» nrs as neeoea, 
-Bieting fui weight ieducing quatrties and exercise pi09ram. 
ftecheck prn. SB J/dh— 
? 2 S^wA*23Q 
Headaches. ____._____-, 
flight recent headache* frequency. Ihe M o n n a l has been helpful, out connneus Co"have « 
some headaches.—These have been present for 10 yeais and lliey ULLUI as a pounding, thiubt 
sensation over the right «ye associated with nausea, — 
-A; Possible vascular headaches. 
Cafergot tablets, one tablet every four hours, prn. Recheck 1n one month. SBJ/dt 
Il^iI_______IIIIIZZ_ZZ_I 
_ _ _ l f l _ ] ^ _ I _ _ _ M _ _ _ _ u i _ i _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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HIWY H 
rJUMitt&£& HOLES 
fc ?M v.<r*a>vi heck on headaches. 
Symptoms have been improved with the Cafergot and the Fiorinal with the Cafergot being 
quite effective at aborting the imgrain headache^, however,he doeS uSe the medicaTion 
-at least every other day end sometimes twice a day. 
Mo examination was made. -
Migraine headaches. 
Elavil 25 mg 1 tablet daily and recheck one month. SBJ/dh 
v /rV ro'Z. ,JJ> 7 -f/tn 
The patient has typical UR1 symptoms, runny nose, coughing, sorethroat, congestion. 
Nose congested, throat erythematus, lungs - clear. 
mt. 
Symptomatic treatment with decongestants and cough syrups. 
—• Rprhprk prn _ — - — . SBJ/dh-
I'-V ; 
Jit-i'^ C'&^t^UjUtd* 
Y/iyufX ^?^ 
i . 
Since last visit, again the symptoms have recurred, runny nose, cough, sorethroat, 
- congestion. 
Nose, congested. 
Throat - Clear. 
-tuuyb- Clear. 
-UR4, j 
Symptomatic treatment with nrnacft, rerhprk prn SBJJdfc 
/ W / ^ / - . K 3 / ]ti*</«*Xi~>4&> 
leadaches. 
Headaches continue and have been present for the past several weeks. She is having 
headaches about two per week. 
y -Hem oluy iudl exam - uriremdrkdble. ——~~ — 
\: Headaches. 
Increasp Flavil tn 75 mg and then inn mg also trial of Fiorinal and f.apexgot^-recheck—. 
in three to four weeks. SBJ/dh 
Headache*; ' Headaches 
"31 Ihe Elavi l has been.Effective at reducing the lieaildUies however he now 
lias severe nightmares. — -
—Q-i No change. 
-P- Discontinue F l a v i l . . . . . . . -
Begin on Desyrel 50 mg. 1 tab le t or 2 at hs as directed. SBJ:Dts i oeqin on u 
J i cat ion overuse. 
Because of headaches and stress, the patient has had some overuse of medications, these 
include FTorinai fj, lyienol #J, Uarvon, Elavil, Desyrel, etc 
- General appearance - Healthy, but the patient appears -somewhat-nervous: " * ~" 
Pulse is-normal—BP; is normal; lungs - cVeei^ — — - T V " rv»n#» •*>' ~ 
,, j. Addumdum 15, page -> 
Medication overuse — Discontinue all medications and tanpr off Flavil n%.or tho nov 
+ 1 .A A%»»» 
APPENDIX H, PAGE 
PROGRESS NOTES 
'tt-iu*?yuiiJx 
Jterherk 
Patient 1s doing wery well. 
He is taking no further medications except tapering schedule of the Elavil under" 
the direction OT his wite. 
"He has !>ume indigestion, occasional tieart burn, sonte nervousness, no he&daehesr-
BP - normal. 
lungs - dear 
Heart - regular. , _ , 
Neck - supple, full range of motion. 
"Headaches resolving. ~" 
Medication over use is now under eontrol. " ^ M-kfc 
Patient is feeling better. SPJ.DTS 
Recheck. [ 0_ __ 
S: The patient is doing well and having no difficulty since the medications have been dis 
continued, he has had no further headaches. He has been slightly nervous, but otherwis< 
Julny wtl 1. *"— 
Ho was told today that he has been fired from his job which is causing suwtranxiely in 
hnth hp and h u unfo 
Oi The patient appears generally calm, no evidence nf aggitatinn nr angpr 
^
:
 Medication withdrawal proceeding well 
borne anxiety and resentment due to loss of job. 
—f _ . 
_ Counseling referral to LPS Social Services was made. SR.i/dh 
•Addendum 13. pac?iJ * 
APPENDIX H 
PAGE 4 
'•'• . ',
,:J! BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THIS THE 13TH DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1988, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED AND NUMBERED CAUSE CAME 
ON-FOR WEARING BEFORE SAID HONORABLE COURT, HONORABLE JAMES 
£. SAWAYA, JUDGE PRESIDING, IN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; COUNTY 
6F SALT'LAKE?'WHEREUPON,'THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, 
fO-WIT: -:TRARY V, TML .:•.'•: • •• : •. . 
'
i;
- THE'COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT WE ARE 
CONVENED WITHOUT THE JURY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE RECORD 
ON CERTAIN MATTERS. ONE THING ABOUT THE INSTRUCTIONS, AS 
FINALLY SETTLED, COUNSEL, NO. 35 INSTRUCTION I HAVE NOTICED 
THAT — 34 SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND I INSERTED NEXT TO THE 
LAST INSTRUCTION TO MAKE ANY SENSE. I AM NOT SURE THAT 
THE REST OF THEM WILL. 
MR, SLAGLE: NEXT TO THE LAST? 
THE COURT: YES. NO. 44. 
MR. SLAGLE: YOU WILL NUMBER IT 44A? 
THE COURT: I WILL PUT IT OUT IN THE NEXT TO THE 
LAST. 34 WILL BE READ NEXT TO 45. 
* MR. KING, YOU WANTED TO MAKE A RECORD ON A MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. YOU MAY MAKE YOUR ORAL MOTION AT 
THIS TIME. 
MR. KING: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I MOVE FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT AGAINST DR. GERALD GOODMAN. I THINK 
THE EVIDENCE FROM ALL SIDES IS THAT HE VIOLATED THE 
ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS OF MEDICAL CARE IN TREATMENT OF 
814 
APPENDIX I, pg. 1 
MR. QUISTBERG,CLEADING TOMR. QUISTBERG BECOMING A DRUG 
SEEKER AND HIM,BECOMING A DRUG ABUSER. THE BASIS OF DR. 
GOODMAN'S DEFENSE, THAT THE PHARMACIST NEVER CALLED HIM, 
IS SIMPLY NOT CREDIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE. HE'S HAD NO 
REACTION TO HIS.ALLEGED WRONGDOING WITH THE PHARMACIST. 
THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE TESTIMONY HE'S GIVEN AND BECAUSE 
THE DEFENSE LACKS CREDIBILITY, I THINK A DIRECTED VERDICT 
IS APPROPRIATE.-
 : j ; , 
....:-•;;•: ' MR. SLAGLE: .WE WILL SUBMIT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT? THE MOTION IS DENIED. COUNSEL, MAY 
I HAVE A STIPULATION ON^THE RECORD YOUR EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION BE TAKEN AFTER THE JURY HAS RETIRED 
TO DELIBERATE? 
MR. KING: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. SLAGLE: WE WOULD STIPULATE, AND I BELIEVE 
THE STIPULATION WOULD BE, THAT NO PARTY WILL TAKE AN APPEAL 
BASED ON THE FACT THAT EXCEPTIONS. WILL BE TAKEN AFTER THE 
JURY RETIRES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IS THAT — 
MR. FERGUSON: STIPULATE TO BOTH. 
MR. KING: THE PLAINTIFF STIPULATES, YOUR HONOR. 
,,,
 : MR. SLAGLE: THE OTHER STIPULATION, I BELIEVE, 
YOUR HONOR, IS THAT NO PARTY HAS ANY OBJECTION TO THE 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM. WE HAVE ALL APPROVED THAT. WE 
WOULD SUBMIT IT ON THAT SPECIAL VERDICT. 
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THE COURT: 'is THAT AGREEABLE? 
H i : P< r .^
 > , ^ l h j G i T H ^ j s CORRECT. 
<:>a.•••: HR. ¥ERGUSON: THAT IS CORRECT. 
VKl':
 M R # SLAGLE: THAT IS CORRECT. 
THE COURT: LET'S HAVE THE JURY COME IN. 
;XVl l/:
 THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT ALL JURORS ARE PRESENT 
AND IN PLACE. MR. OLCOTT AND MRS. GERMAN, I SUPPOSE — 
- •'•'•"'•
:
 MR. SLAGLE: I THINK THEY GET TO STAY HERE UNTIL 
AFTER CLOSING ARGUMENT. — 
THE COURT: I SUPPOSE THAT IS TRUE. I GUESS YOU 
GET TO GO THE WHOLE DISTANCE. OKAY, NOTHING MORE FOR THE 
RECORD, COUNSEL, BEFORE I INSTRUCT? 
MR. KING: NO. 
MR. SLAGLE: DEFENDANT GOODMAN HAS RESTED. 
MR. FERGUSON: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
CWHEREUPON, THE COURT INSTRUCTS THE JURY.) 
THE COURT: MR. KING, YOU MAY PROCEED WITH 
CLOSING. 
CWHEREUPON, ALL THREE COUNSEL GAVE CLOSING STATE 
MENTS TO THE JURY AND THE JURY RETIRED TO THE JURY ROOM.) 
MR. KING: PLAINTIFF EXCEPTS TO THE REFUSAL OF 
THE COURT TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5. IT SETS 
OUT THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF NEGLIGENCE EXPLAINED AGAINST 
DR. GOODMAN. NO COMPARABLE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN. IT WAS 
DRAFTED NEUTRALLY AND NOT GIVING IT WAS ERROR. 
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PLAINTIFF EXCEPTS TO THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
! HIS PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3. PLAINTIFF SIMILARLY 
EXCEPTS TO INSTRUCTIONS 3 AND 4 WHICH ARE ALTERNATIVE 
' VARIATIONS OF THE INSTRUCTION:. 
i INSTRUCTION NO. 6 EXCEPTION, IT SPELLS OUT THE 
DUTY OF THE DOCTOR, INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES TO MONITOR 
-. THE PROGRESS OF HIS PATIENT WHILE USING A CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCE. 
THE SAME EXCEPTION FOR INSTRUCTION 7A. 
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RULE 11. Signing of pleadings, motions and 
other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in his individual name who is duly licensed 
to practice in the state of Utah. The 
attorney's address also shall be stated. A 
party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other 
paper and state his address. Except when 
otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity 
that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two 
witnesses or of one witness sustained by 
corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has 
read the pleadings, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief formed after 
reasonable inguiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay 
to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expense incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other 
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
[Emphasis added] 
Appendix J 
RULE 30, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Depositions upon 
oral examination. 
(c) Examination and cross-examination; 
oath; objections. 
Examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may proceed as permitted at trial 
under the provisions of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The officer before whom the 
deposition is to be taken shall put the 
witnesses on oath and shall personally or by 
someone acting under his direction and in his 
presence record the testimony of the witness. 
The testimony shall be taken stenographically 
or recorded by any other means ordered in 
accordance with Subdivision (b)(4) of this 
rule. If requested by one of the parties, 
the testimony shall be transcribed. 
[Emphasis added] 
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PR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the 
Bounds of the Law. 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer 
shall not: 
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial, or take other action on 
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another. 
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or 
defense that is unwarranted under existing 
law, except that he may advance such claim or 
defense if it can be supported by good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law. 
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to 
disclose that which he is required by law to 
reveal. 
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or 
false evidence. "" : 
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of 
law or fact. 
(6) Participate in the creation or 
preservation of evidence when he knows or it 
is obvious that the evidence is false. 
(7) Counsel or assist his client in 
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal 
or fraudulent. 
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal 
conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary 
Rule. [Emphasis added.] 
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58-12-36, Utah Code Annotated. Medical Practice Act-
"Unprofessional Conduct" defined -
The words, "unprofessional conduct" as 
relating to the practice of medicine are 
defined to include 
"(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to 
the recognized standards of ethics of the 
medical profession, or any conduct or 
practice which does or might constitute a 
danger to the health, welfare or safety of 
the patient or the public, or any conduct, 
practice or condition which does or might 
impair the ability safely and skillfully to 
practice medicine." [Emphasis added] 
58-17-14.8. Pharmacists. Oral prescriptions-
Drugs may be dispensed by pharmacists or 
certificated pharmacy interns upon an oral 
prescription of a practitioner licensed to 
prescribe, provided such oral prescription is 
promptly reduced to writing and filed by the 
pharmacist or certified pharmacy intern. 
[Empha sis added.] 
58-17-14.11, Utah Code Annotated. 
Pharmacists. Habit-forming drugs -Limitation 
on disposition. Any proprietor of a pharmacy 
or other person who shall sell, dispose of, 
or permit the sale or other disposition of 
any drug intended for use by man which under 
the laws of this state or the laws of the 
United States, or lawful regulations 
thereunder, has been designated as habit 
forming, unsafe for use except under the 
supervision of a practitioner licensed to 
administer such drugs, or otherwise limited 
to use under professional supervision of a 
practitioner licensed by law to prescribe, 
unless it is dispensed upon a prescription to 
a practitioner licensed by law to administer 
the same, shall be guilty of an offense. 
[Emphasis added] 
58-37-8(21, Utah Code Annotated. Controlled 
Substances. Prohibited Acts - Penalties -
(vi) For a practitioner licensed in 
accordance with this act knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer 
dosages of a controlled substance in excess 
of medically recognized guantities necessary 
to treat the ailment, malady or condition of 
the ultimate user. [Emphasis added] 
JinnpnHi v M 
78-24-8, Utah Code Annotated. Privileged 
Communications. There are particular 
relations in which it is the policy of the 
law to encourage confidence and to preserve 
it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be 
examined as a witness in the following cases: 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the 
consent of his client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client to him or 
his advice given therein, in the course of 
professional employment; nor can an 
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk 
be examined, without the consent of his 
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of 
which has been acquired in such capacity. 
78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated. Witnesses. 
Duty to Answer Questions - Privilege. 
A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although 
his answer may establish a claim against 
himself; but he need not give an answer which 
will have a tendency to subject him to 
punishment for a felony; nor need he give an 
answer which will have a direct tendency to 
degrade his character, unless it is to the 
very fact in issue or to a fact from which 
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a 
witness must answer as to the fact of his 
previous conviction of felony. [Emphasis 
added] 
78-51-26, Utah Code Annotated. Duties of 
Attorneys and Counselors. It is the duty of 
an attorney or counselor: (4) to employ for 
the purposes of maintaining the causes 
confided to him such means only as are 
consistent with truth, and never to seek to 
mislead the judges by any artifice or false 
statement of fact or law; [Emphasis added] 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ifl 
If you find from the evidence that plaintiff reasonably 
relied on receiving the refills of Fiorinal #3 as being based on 
the knowledge and approval of Dr. Goodman, that he relied on Dr. 
Goodman's expertise, and that his addiction or drug dependency 
began before he had reason to stop relying on his doctor, then 
you are to find that plaintiff was not contributarily negligent 
in becoming drug dependent or drug addicted. That is, a patient 
has the right to rely on the advice of his attending physician, 
which includes the prescription of medicines until such time as 
the patient could reasonably know that the physician is in error 
in his treatment of the patient or is inattentive to and unaware 
of the needs of the patient. If plaintiff's addiction or 
dependency occurred before he had such awareness or while he 
reasonably relied on his belief that Dr. Goodman was authorizing 
the refills, plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence. 
If you find r*^ >m the evid^ rtce that the money plaintiff 
acknowledges he wrongfully t^ok was taken after he became 
addicted or drug dependenkxm Fiorinal #3, that is a matter you 
may consider in asse*Bing\^the appropriate amount of damages 
plaintiff is entitl^Q to recovers, it is not, however, a defense 
on the issueybt whether any\of the defendants are liable to 
plaintiff. ^ 
APPENDIX 0 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3/ 
It is the duty of a patient to follow reasonable instruc-
tions given him by the practitioner undertaking his care and 
treatment. If you find that the injury complained of in this 
case resulted from failure of the patient to comply with this 
duty and was in no way attributable to any deviation from the 
required standards of care and skill of the defendant, your 
verdict should be for the defendant. 
Ariri*=»riHi im T o 
INSTRUCTION NO. & 
A doctor is not an insurer of the health of his 
patient, nor is he responsible for a favorable outcome of 
treatment he gives the patient. 
The doctor has a duty to give his patient acceptable 
medical care. This means care conforming to the acceptable 
level of practice of other doctors properly performing their 
duties in regard to their patient in regard to the specific 
aspect of medical practice involved. 
It is for you to determine, from the evidence, what 
the acceptable standard of medical care is for Dr. Goodman in 
regard to each of the following areas: 
1. The acceptable standard of care for a surgeon 
prescribing Fiorinal #3 for a patient in regard to keeping 
track of refills of that prescription. 
2. The acceptable standard of care for a surgeon in 
regard to being familiar with the physical condition of his 
patient at the time the surgeon authorizes a refill of 
Fiorinol #3. 
3. The acceptable standard of care for a surgeon in 
forming an informed diagnosis of the patient's condition for 
which he prescribes and renews Fiorinol #3 for his patient. 
APPENDIX Q, pg. 1 
4. The acceptable standard of care for a surgeon 
authorizing refills of Fiorinol #3, if you find such to be the 
fact, in regard to determining whether the patient is becoming 
dependent on, or addicted to, Fiorinol #3. 
5• The acceptable standard of care for a surgeon in 
regard to instructing and supervising those working subject to 
his control in regard to their advising him of calls from the 
pharmacy requesting authorization for refills of Fiorinol #3. 
6. The acceptable standard of care concerned with the 
doctor complying with statutes intended for the benefit of the 
patient- There are two applicable statutes of the State of Utah. 
(a) 58-12-36(15, Utah Code Annotated, 
requires that a doctor, whether by act or by 
omission, may not do anything which might 
constitute a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety of his patient without good cause. 
(b) 58-37-8(2)(vi), Utah Code Annotated, 
requires that a doctor not knowingly and 
intentionally prescribe or administer dosages 
of a controlled substance in excess of 
medically recognized quantities necessary to 
treat the ailment, malady or condition of his 
patient. 
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A violation of either of these statutes, if you so 
find# may be evidence of negligence. 
7. The acceptable level of practice in regard to the 
duty of a doctor when prescribing, or represcribing, Fiorinal 
#3 for his patient Jhs to advise the patient that Fiorinal #3 
contains two controlled substances, that its continued use 
could present the patient with the hazard of drug dependency or 
addiction as to the care the doctor should use to advise the 
patient in regard to monitoring himself and recognizing 
symptoms within himself that could alert him to the possibility 
of becoming addicted or dependent. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
Dr. Goodman violated any of the acceptable levels of practice 
in regard to his treatment of plaintiff, you would find Dr. 
Goodman negligent. 
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INSTRI JCTION NO. V 
It is use reasonable skill and 
diligence . aiagnosinc t ho condition ol his patieimt t.hrough 
observation i.esting '*xaminatic,H, • -1 * 1 hist-M', ui SU. !. other 
means .;is . , . '. *., . - .-. continuing duty as long as 
the doctor-patien relationship continues. You are instructed 
that as long ac ;* ioctor authorizes ndjlJ 01 i eiiewa 11» of a 
presc7ipli.il patient that the doctor-patient relationship 
is continuing. H a prescription being refilled is of a 
controlled substance Rnoun I h.iut add \ olive potential 5+• is a 
part oi the doctor's continuing duty, as you weigh tr.e evidence 
on this subject given to you during the tri al --main 
sufficiently f aim i i ai WJ I ii the patient !,o use reasonable efforts 
to determine if the patient is at risk of becoming addicted to or 
dependent -i the prescription, and ;i f so, to take appropriate 
step:
 t : M, eof the patient's health. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. H 
By undertaking professional service to a patient, a 
physician and surgeon impliedly represents that he possesses, 
and it is hie duty to possess, that degree of learning, skill 
and diligence ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons 
of good standing. 
If he undertakes such a service in a special branch of 
medical, surgical or other healing science, it is his duty to 
possess that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed 
by physicians and surgeons of good standing who engage in that 
special practice in the same locality. 
It is his further duty to use the care ordinarily 
exercised in like cases by reputable members of his profession; 
to use reasonable diligence and his best judgment in the 
exercise of his skill and the application of his learning, in 
an effort to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed. 
A violation of any of those duties is a form of 
negligence that we call malpractice. 
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INSTRUCTION NO J "ST. 
The Controlled Substance Act * the Utah Code at Section 58 -
37-8 provides that it is a * i 
For a practitioner licensed in accordance with this Act 
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or administer 
dosages of a controlled substance in excess of 
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat the 
ailment, malady or condition of the ultimate user. 
You are instructed that Dr. Goniini.ui I * licensed 
practit i one i as ,, .i ,i i l.i .1 li, thi Act. 
You are further instructed that Fiorinal U ii> a controlled 
substance as defined in the Act. 
f i r I i < i oJ at ion of tu* r statute occurred, that 
violation may be, used as proof of negligence by c^e person who 
violated the statute. 
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